

DRAFT

FOR ICAPS ONLY

23
19 September 1949

MEMORANDUM TO THE STANDING COMMITTEE MEMBERS

SUBJECT: Mr. Armstrong's Four Problems

Reference: Recent Standing Committee Meetings.

1. It is suggested that the following report be submitted to the IAC members to determine what further action, if any, they desire to take. *Kindly telephone your reactions to Scaps.*

2. Since this is a matter of giving advice to the Director, it does not require unanimous agreement among the IAC members as does a paper going to the National Security Council.

3. Maybe members of the Standing Committee, other than those from State and the Department of Defense, will care to add comments or will care to express an opinion on these matters *other than those expressed in State's letter of Aug 2nd and the Defense memo submitted at the Sept 8th meeting.*

REPORT TO THE IAC

The Standing Committee members of the IAC have held two meetings *the 1st recommendations in the four papers submitted on 6* to discuss ~~(with due consideration)~~ *the four problems raised in Mr. Armstrong's letter of August 2nd.*

PROBLEM I - RECOMMENDATIONS:

Coordination of Intelligence Activities
Standing Committee members
1. In General, *they* are in agreement with Mr. Armstrong's Recommendation *1, 2 and 3* ~~1, 2 and 3~~ pertaining to ICAPS and the Standing Committee.

2. The Department of Defense members of the Standing Committee, *however,* consider that the functions, responsibilities, and membership of ICAPS and the Standing Committee should be as follows:

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1. ICAPS:

- (1) Should be composed of full-time members contributed by the agencies represented on the IAC.
- (2) Should be under the direction of and responsible to the Director of Central Intelligence.
- (3) Should have, as one of its primary responsibilities, the accomplishment of staff work in connection with the development and presentation of policies and procedures for the production and coordination of intelligence by the various agencies represented on the IAC. In matters of this sort the objective of ICAPS should be the production of ^{an} unbiased, comprehensive presentation or report covering all aspects of a subject. This it should be able to do because of the wide variety in training, experience, and general background of its members.
- (4) Should function as a secretariat for the IAC and the Standing Committee of the IAC.
- (5) Should perform such other functions as the Director of Central Intelligence may direct.

Caps 2. The Standing Committee of the IAC:

- (1) Should be composed of at least one representative from each IAC agency.
- (2) Should review, on behalf of the IAC, such matters as may be referred to it for action by the IAC or the IAC Secretariat (ICAPS).

Normally all staff work on such matters would be accomplished by ICAPS prior to submission of items to the SC/IAC or the IAC.

- (3) ~~Action by the SC/IAC~~ ^{its action} could then be directed primarily toward the

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following objectives:

- a. Presentation and discussion of revisions which SC/IAC members might consider desirable, from ^{the} ~~an~~ standpoint of the agencies they represent.
- b. Thorough indoctrination of all SC/IAC members in all aspects of the matter under consideration including the views of other SC/IAC members and hence the probable recommendations they will make to their respective Directors when the matter comes up for consideration by the IAC itself. (There should be no formal voting by the SC/IAC and it should be clearly understood that the views expressed by SC/IAC members will not necessarily be the same on any particular subject as those presented by their Directors when action is taken at the IAC level).

3. The Department of Defence members of the Standing Committee recommend that the IAC approve the substance of the ^{above paragraph} ~~foregoing~~ and recommend to the DCI that it be published in appropriate form for the information and guidance of all concerned.

4. ~~The~~ Department of Defense members of the Standing Committee also ^(I-4, II, III, and IV) recommend that the remainder of the Department of State proposals be referred, as a first step, to ICAPS for appropriate staff action.

5. ~~In discussing~~ ^{Under the} the remainder of Mr. Armstrong's four problems, ~~were discussed.~~

The Standing Committee agreed that the wording of Recommendation I, 4, was confusing and that it should be separated into two paragraphs and read:

4. "That CIA establish an Estimates Division in accordance with the recommendations of the Dulles Report" and that there be a new paragraph 5, reading:
5. "That CIA fulfill its coordinating responsibilities in respect to intelligence production in accordance with the following principles:-."

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6. However, only State wished to have established an Estimates Division ^(new P I-4) as the Department of Defense Agencies dissented and proposed that the subject be referred to ICAPS for further study. The CIA representative also dissented on the grounds that the Director does not desire to have a new, separate "Estimates Division." AEC and the FBI abstained. The Department of Defense Agencies, in regard to the new paragraph I-5, mentioned above, recommended that the principles (a) to (f) ^{in Mr. Armstrong's recommendation} be referred to ICAPS for further study. State and AEC approved of all of these principles and FBI abstained. The CIA ^{position at the meeting, with} representative pointed out with regard to paragraph (e) ^{was} that the obligations of this agency would not permit it to ^{adjust} ~~fit in~~ its production in accordance with the departments' "existing programs." Nor could ^{CIA} ~~it~~ agree that assignment ^{the} of personnel to IAC agencies from CIA, reference (f), was a part of its coordinating responsibilities.

Production of National Intelligence
PROBLEM II - RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. The Department of Defense Agencies and the AEC accepted in principle ^{State's} the recommendations for Problem II. The FBI abstained and ~~so~~ ^{rejected the principles expressed in Recommendation 1(a) and} did the CIA representative on the grounds that, with respect to this definition of National Intelligence, ~~that~~ a matter of political substance could never be regarded as National Intelligence.

Research Reports
PROBLEM III - RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. It was agreed that Recommendation III-1, should have deleted the last clause and be changed to read "That, aside from National Intelligence, CIA will produce intelligence reports only in the ^{the} fields of

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common concern," and that Recommendation III, 2, should have added to it "for further approval by the NSC." *With these changes, the Standing Committee approved of the recommendations, FBI abstaining.*

PROBLEM IV - *Political Summary*
RECOMMENDATIONS.

1. The members of the Standing Committee agreed to this recommendation. FBI abstained.

PRESCOTT CHILDS
Chief, ICAPS

With these changes included, the State & Defense members agreed to the recommendations, FBI abstaining. CIA maintained it performs "services" of common concern (██████ etc) but found Recommendation 1, as written, too restrictive.

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*Add Recommendation
to State of*

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